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Haacke’s ‘critique [of] the power of images’, Joselit 
affirms how Ai ‘exploited the power of art to transport 
people and things both spatially and imaginatively’. 
Joselit’s joyful science certainly irons out any remain-
ing contradictions among avant-garde projects – the art 
world is corrupt and it is also ineffective – but it does 
so at the expense of making its effectiveness identical 
with its corruption. 
Putting aside the one-dimensional account of art-
works as ‘reifications’ – ‘mediums lead to objects, and 
thus reification’ – it would take only a little reflection 
to see that the end of the distribution of wealth in 
the ‘era of art’, at precisely the moment Joselit’s 
‘reframing, capturing, reiterating, and documenting’ 
paradigm first emerged (a set of procedures exempli-
fied for him by the work of Sherrie Levine), was 
also the moment at which the US economy began 
its most aggressive turn away from equality. In the 
period between 1932 and 1979, during what many 
economists call the ‘Great Compression’, the top 1 
per cent’s income share dropped from 24 per cent in 
1928 to 9 per cent in 1970. The ‘Great Divergence’ 
first emerged in 1979 – in artistic terms we’ll call it 
the ‘era of formatting’ – when the richest 1 per cent’s 
income share began its exponential rise. Thus Joselit’s 
reiterated call for a ‘currency of exchange that is not 
cash, but rather a nonmonetized form of transaction’, 
which he defines as ‘the power of connectivity’, has 
a way of simply being the form art takes not under 
neoliberalism but as it. If art is, as Joselit says, ‘the 
paradigmatic object of globalization’ based on the 
nonmonetized exchange of ‘cultural difference’, then 
it is paradigmatic for neoliberalism as well, which, 
as ideology, can be defined by its capacity to turn 
every (monetary) exchange into culture (exchange), 
actively obscuring the former with the latter. And to 
call that mode of transformation the model of power 
today is certainly right, but it is wrong to celebrate 
it. The newly liberated ‘users as shareholders’ own 
stock in a company that makes them feel better about 
themselves, and when they feel better about themselves 
they tend to work harder for lower wages. Or maybe 
we should see things from Joselit’s perspective and 
recognize the form of power hidden in the idea that 
the ‘quantitative density of connections … ultimately 
leads … to qualitative differences’. If those qualitative 
differences mean greater inequality but also ‘greater 
political openness’, then Joselit has described a real 
achievement.
Todd Cronan
Third-way aesthetics
Christoph Menke, Force: A Fundamental Concept of Aesthetic Anthropology, Fordham University Press, New 
York, 2013. xiv + 111 pp. £14.99 pb., 978 0 8232 4973 2.
Christoph Menke has written a slim book, but one 
that, at least at first sight, seems to pack a big punch. 
It comes with the promise of both a neglected ‘funda-
mental concept’ – ‘force’ – and a brand new field, since 
‘aesthetic anthropology’ seems not to have bothered 
anyone that much until now. Unfortunately, a bold 
intervention is not much use in a non-existent field, and 
this pretty much sums up the problem with this book. 
Menke revives an age-old dispute as to the correct 
usage of the word ‘aesthetics’, arising out of the 
eighteenth-century conflation of aesthetics ‘in the 
Greek sense’ (referring to the things of sensibility) 
with the philosophical treatment of art. The book’s 
main contention is that, however counter-intuitive, 
this conflation is not to be undone by prising apart 
art and aesthetics. (That would be what Peter Osborne 
has done, for example, in ‘Art beyond Aesthetics’ in 
his recent Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of 
Contemporary Art – a text that is almost a negative 
image of the one under review.) Menke goes for a 
third way: it is aesthetics itself that must be internally 
split. Menke’s unsung hero here is Herder, and the 
thrust of the book retraces his critique of Baumgarten, 
to the point where at times it is unclear whose voice 
we are reading. To wit, the Baumgartian attempt to 
extend philosophical inquiry into the realm of the 
sensible backfired when it misrecognized its object. As 
a philosophical project aesthetics was stillborn when 
it mistook the animating ‘obscure forces’ of the aes-
thetic for ‘subjective faculties’. Inheriting a Cartesian 
understanding of subjectivity that equated cognition 
with the capacity for action, it took aesthetic forces to 
be fundamentally practical, to be exercised so as to 
improve their performance and serve as self-guidance. 
Against this Baumgartian ‘aesthetics of capacity’ 
Menke proposes an ‘aesthetics of force’. Here, forces 
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must be understood as neither mechanical nor biologi-
cal, as unconscious energies that cannot be trained or 
directed, that are purposeless and follow no laws. 
Therefore no ‘aesthetic training’ or refinement of taste 
is useful or possible. These forces are human, but not 
yet subjective. They are not at the subject’s disposal 
for the performing of actions; they are at play and 
realize only themselves. And yet these obscure forces 
are understood as the human ground of the subject’s 
capacities, as the precondition of reason. The challenge 
is to rethink the object of aesthetics as one that can 
only be negatively delimited, remaining stubbornly 
obscure and impervious to enlightening. For aesthetics 
to become the thinking of these forces as the ground 
of man (sic), a ‘contraction of philosophy to anthro-
pology’ is required. 
Moreover, inasmuch as Baumgartian aesthetics had 
made the preposterous mistake of taking as its starting 
point the human faculties that aesthetic forces had 
become, an aesthetic anthropology must be genealogi-
cal; albeit in an explicitly non-Foucauldian sense, for 
Foucault too is seen to be afflicted by the Baumgartian 
confusion. Needless to say, this is a socially blind 
genealogy. It must probe subjective faculties for the 
obscure forces out of which they emerge, which they 
carry within themselves and into which they are always 
in a process of turning. For the process is an ongoing 
one, and subjective faculties emerging out of obscure 
forces are always liable to turn into them again. 
Accordingly, aesthetic events – the object of study for 
an aesthetics of force – is the turning of faculties into 
obscure forces, through a process of aestheticization. 
With this insight, philosophy itself is transformed and 
a new quarrel between philosophy and aesthetics is 
inaugurated. This new quarrel is not based on mere 
antagonism (the Platonic rejection of poetry), nor on 
alternative accounts of the same object (as in Kant); 
instead it poses the aesthetic as a different and compet-
ing mode of reflection that cannot be a mere object for 
philosophy, but, as its ground, cannot be discarded. By 
turning to the aesthetic ‘philosophy turns to something 
that calls into question the form of philosophical 
thinking itself’. 
So far so good, but in a book of just six short 
chapters, the strange ahistoricity of Menke’s narrative 
begins to grate by the end of Chapter 5 (not to mention 
his and his translator’s anachronistic decision to stick 
to masculine pronouns, and the gendered ‘man’, in 
order not to ‘compromise the brevity and fluidity of 
the language’ – a gesture that is by now so violent it 
interferes unduly with the flow of reading). While it is 
true that Herder has not been in anyone’s thoughts that 
much of late, it is no secret that his ‘aesthetic anthro-
pology’ comes out of Spinoza. But Menke chooses to 
write as if uncovering a long neglected alternative, as 
if there was no current Spinozist aesthetics in relation 
to which this book would inevitably be read. Indeed, 
Deleuze makes an appearance just once, in a footnote. 
The traditional disregard that French and German 
philosophies have displayed for each other can hardly 
excuse this fact. But, lamentable as this is, it is not the 
worst of the book’s problems. This comes to the fore 
when we turn to the other half of the Baumgartian 
conflation, the philosophical treatment of art. Menke 
explains that ‘the aesthetic cannot, and should not, 
concern art alone’. Our question is: how does it concern 
art at all? 
As was also the case in Menke’s previous foray 
into aesthetics, The Sovereignty of Art (reviewed in RP 
94), ‘art’ remains gloriously foggy and conveniently 
unencumbered by any particular artworks. Menke’s 
aesthetic force seems to be an updated version of the 
aesthetic negativity that in The Sovereignty of Art was 
a precondition of artistic autonomy. As was the case 
then, Menke not only denies the social embeddedness 
of artistic practice, he makes the negation of social 
praxis a precondition of art. But against the Hegelian 
charge of the ‘objectless relation to the self’ of the 
aesthetic, Menke argues that aesthetic play does not 
take place before, beside or above the praxis of deter-
mining; it is merely other to it. Hence, no Schillerian 
leap is required for ‘aesthetic representation’ (which 
presumably includes art-making); this is ‘sparked’ 
by their antagonism, by that becoming aesthetic of 
practical faculties that Menke calls aestheticization. 
The one factor that distinguishes artworks from mere 
beautiful things here is that the former ‘also show the 
process of aestheticization’. Unfortunately, the only 
evidence of this we are offered is a dubiously apposite 
quotation from Schlegel. 
Some time later, Nietzsche is dragged unrecon-
structed into Menke’s ahistorical present. What he 
bears is an image of the tragic artist as the one 
with enough dexterity to handle intoxication without 
regressing to mere barbarism. In his intoxication the 
artist liberates his aesthetic forces to exceed or fall 
short of his practical faculties. 
In the pleasure they take in their own aesthetic 
condition, the artists see another good revealed, one 
that differs from the practical goodness of actively 
realised purposes… The artist is always able to let 
his forces exercise themselves freely … even in the 
face of fear, despair, and utter defeat … even where 
his faculties are destroyed. 
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Who are these artists? The last time we saw them 
being described in these terms – heroic, intoxicated, 
and conveniently male – abstract expressionism was 
all the rage. But I digress; this heroic gesture discov-
ers in tragic failure another good, which is not the 
practical good and is not subordinated to practical 
reason. With it, the book concludes (paraphrasing the 
Twilight of the Idols) that the ethical-political import 
of aesthetic experience lies in its providing ‘a freedom 
from practical freedom that is not a submission to an 
overwhelming outside power’. Given Menke’s previous 
engagement with Adorno, this version of autonomy 
seems intractably solipsistic. 
After reading Force one might be tempted to rec-
ommend that Menke visit some biennials, but this 
would be idle since he has already been to quite a 
few. In fact, he was one of 100 thinkers (dead and 
alive) chosen to provide ‘100 thoughts’ for Docu-
menta 13 last summer. Since the original German-
language publication of Force in 2008 he has made 
the rounds of European museums from MACBA to 
OCA, and Sternberg Press has published his lecture 
‘The Aesthetic Critique of Judgement’, bulked up by 
a preface and Q&A session. One has to wonder how 
it is that Menke became a darling of the artworld. 
Ironically, it could be the trend for post-Deleuzean 
affect theory, which has been very much the thing 
of late. Whatever it is, the problem is that Menke’s 
theory does not take kindly to such close contact with 
actually existing artworks. 
What is discouraging about books like Menke’s, 
when read alongside his artworld presence, is that 
these encounters – however brief – seem not to have 
engendered a minimal curiosity about the other partner. 
In this regard, philosophy is the guiltiest side. These 
days most artists consider reading and writing part 
of their practice; however feeble, most have some 
level of familiarity with the philosophical tradition. 
The artworld does not need philosophical homilies 
delivered as if from an otherworldly stage. That art and 
philosophy are both so eager to embrace the distortedly 
exalted view each has composed of the other does not 
bode well for the prospects of their respective fields. 
At this point, conjuring up obscure forces might be 
precisely the wrong thing to do. 
Yaiza Hernández Velázquez
Shot/reverse shot
Robert Sinnerbrink, New Philosophies of Film: Thinking Images, Continuum, London and New York, 2011. 247 
pp., £55.00 hb., £17.99 pb., 978 1 44112 257 5 hb., 978 1 44115 343 2 pb.
Recent years have witnessed a growth in publications 
seeking to stake out a newly defined and emerging 
territory named, by certain of its exponents, film-
philosophy. Indeed, one of the primary exponents 
in an anglophone context, founder of the web portal 
film-philosophy, Daniel Frampton, precisely coined 
the term ‘filmosophy’ in his 2006 book of that title 
in order to describe the supposed immanence of the 
conceptual activity associated with the discipline of 
philosophy – let’s call it thought – to cinema. Nonethe-
less, this needs immediate qualification. For what is at 
stake is some cinema. There is an evaluative dimension 
that lies at the crux of the battle between cognitivism 
and film-philosophy in which Robert Sinnerbrink’s 
new book seeks to intervene. More particularly, New 
Philosophies of Film responds to what it describes as 
a need to ‘steer a successful course between the Scylla 
of dogmatism and the Charybdis of reductionism’ that 
would apparently arrange the battlefield at present. At 
the same time, for Sinnerbrink, the so-called Grand 
Theory which dominated academic film discourse in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and which was a target of the 
most influential of the cognitivists, Noël Carroll and 
David Bordwell, is the main protagonist in stimulating 
the very reductionism and dogmatism which continues 
to dominate exchanges between cognivitists and film-
philosophers today. 
So what is film-philosophy? A good deal of impetus 
for one strand of it derives from the influence of 
Deleuze, and it is often characterized as indicating a 
switch from Lacanian orthodoxies – still represented, 
albeit in idiosyncratic Hegelian form and operating 
outside mainstream film studies, by Žižek’s writings 
on film. This strand is characterized by a commit-
ment to immanence, tied to Deleuze’s insistence that 
films think, a view held by the other doyen of cine-
thinking, Stanley Cavell. Philosophy departments, 
however, and at least certain film departments, at 
universities during the 1980s, also began to play host 
to a quite distinct approach to cinema, one fuelled 
by analytical philosophy, but sharing with Deleuze a 
sense of the limitations of both psychoanalysis and 
